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ORIGINALISM AS FABLE
(REVIEWING ERIC SEGALL,
ORIGINALISMAS FAITH)
D. A. Jeremy Telman*
Eric Segall's Originalism as Faith provides both a history of the
originalist movement in constitutional interpretation and a critique of
that movement from the perspective of legal realism. This Review Article
summarizes Segall's main argument.: as originalism has abandoned
deference to the political branches, it has become indistinguishable
from its nemesis, living constitutionalism. Emptied of substance,
originalism becomes nothing more than an expression of faith.
Segall makes his argument very convincingly, evidencing both his
knowledge of originalism, in all its variants, and his mastery of
constitutionaldoctrine.
This Article offers two ways in which Segall's exemplary work
might be supplemented First, it teases out the various meanings that
'faith" can have in this context, rangingfrom quasi-religiousbelief to
myth to ideology to political credo. Second, it offers two alternative
narratives as supplements to Segall's legal realistcritique. Originalists
insist that their approachhas "bite," which they contend distinguishes it
from unprincipled living constitutionalism. In the alternative, Jack
Balkin reconciles originalism and living constitutionalism. Legal
decision-makers, following his "living originalism," may be legal
realists, but their construction of the Constitution must be constrained
by their duties of goodfaith andfidelity to the Constitution.
Originalism with bite and living originalism provide theoretical
responses to Segall's challenges, but their positions must also accord
with the reality of constitutional adjudication. Segall challenges
originalists to reconcile their faith in unelected judges with a
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University Law School. Thanks to Cynthia Rutz and to
members of the Valparaiso University Writing Circle for helpful writing suggestions. Thanks to
Karen Koelemeyer for her editorial assistance.
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Constitution designed to provide governmental accountability through
democratic processes. If they cannot do so, originalism is not a true
account of ourjudicialprocesses but a fable designed to disguise a new
version of legislation by the judiciary as the neutral application of
legal rules.

I. INTRODUCTION
Those who advocate for originalism in constitutional interpretation
agree on two principles. First, the "fixation thesis" affirms that the
meaning of each constitutional clause "is fixed at the time [it] is framed
and ratified."' Second, the "constraint principle" stands for the view that
the meaning of the constitutional text should constrain those who
interpret, implement, and enforce constitutional doctrine.2 Eric J. Segall
has been among originalism's most prolific, engaged, and insightful
critics. Segall's new book, Originalismas Faith,3 collects in one volume
his many contributions to the debate regarding originalism in
constitutional interpretation. It also provides the first book-length critical
4
history of originalism as an intellectual movement.
Segall, who endorses the legal realist view that "the justices'
decisions are driven primarily by their personal values,"5 is not an
originalist. Nevertheless, he admires the first generation of originalists,6
whose calls for judicial restraint were a response to the perceived

1. Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REv.
1935, 1941 (2013).
2. Id. at 1942.
3. ERIC J. SEGALL, ORIGINALISM AS FArr (2018) [hereinafter SEGALL, FAITH].
4. Partisans of originalism have produced their own histories, which do not all advertise
themselves as histories of originalism, but present the history of constitutional jurisprudence in the
United States as a history of the rise, fall, and hoped-for renewal of originalism. See RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

363-72 & nn.l-41, 408 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (1901) (arguing that the Supreme Court is not a
continuing constitutional convention but has a more modest role bound by the Framers' original
intentions); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 28-33, 77-78, 348-49 (1990) (chronicling the politicization of the Supreme Court and the
movement away from courts that apply neutral principles); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF
MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEw: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 5157, 233-35 (1986) (contrasting the nineteenth-century tradition of judicial "interpretation" with
judicial "legislation" beginning in the Lochner Era). Johnathan O'Neill's book provides the most
even-handed historical treatment of the history of originalism. See JOHNATHAN O'NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 12-42, 94-95 (2005)
(analyzing the development of originalism as a political and constitutional idea).
5. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Segall calls them "Original Originalists." Id. at 10. They include Raoul Berger and Lino
Graglia. See id. at 8.
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excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts.7 For Segall, originalism has
to be a mechanism for constraining judges.8 Because contemporary
originalism does not constrain judges, it is, for Segall, no different from
the living constitutionalism that originalists denounce.9 As he puts it,
"Originalism today, as opposed to the kind advocated by Judge Bork and
Raoul Berger, is simply living constitutionalism by another name."" As
originalists have departed from deference to the political branches,
Segall thinks originalism has become a matter of "faith,"'" but by
"faith," he means something more like myth, con, swindle, sham, scam,
or fable.
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's "Prologue" to Originalism as Faith
succinctly lays out the originalists' dilemma as Segall sees it. 2 If
originalism really did constrain judges, it would yield unacceptable
results. 3 It would require courts to overturn judicial decisions that now
enjoy overwhelming support.' 4 Originalists accept the Court's broad
equal protection jurisprudence and protections of privacy rights, as do
most Americans,15 despite the consensus that those doctrines expand
federal protections beyond the original intent or meaning of the relevant
constitutional provisions. 6 However, by adhering to non-originalist
precedent, contemporary originalists promote the very judicial practices
Today, despite
originalists condemned.
that first-generation
originalist
judges
Segall
finds,
originalism's promise of constraint,
decide cases in accordance with their policy preferences with the same
frequency as do non-originalist judges.' 7 It is unfair, Segall says, for
"justices to sternly lecture us (and other justices), about the importance
they deem
of adhering to text and original meaning when they, whenever
18
principles.'
those
from
stray
also
enough,
it important
Segall's approach implies a somewhat surprising hierarchy of
normatively desirable judicial and academic practice. For Segall, living
7.

See id at 6.

8. See id.
at 7, 10, 13, 99-101,179-91.
9. See id. at 81,185.
10. Id. at 185.
11. See id.
at 83, 185-86.
12. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Prologue to SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at xiii-xvi.
13. Id.at xiv.
14. See id.
at xiv-xvi.
15. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 122-24, 127-30; The State of Privacy in PostSnowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-in-america (surveying American attitudes towards privacy
law).
16. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 128, 157.
17. See id.
at 5.
18. Id.at 135.
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constitutionalism is the best approach because it provides the most
accurate description of what judges always have done. 19 Next comes
first-generation originalism, which is principled but descriptively
inaccurate. Finally, contemporary originalism is neither principled nor
accurate. The hierarchy is surprising because contemporary originalism
is closer to living constitutionalism than was first-generation
originalism. Where others might see careful scholars responding flexibly
to new challenges to their explanatory paradigm, Segall sees adherents
desperately flailing as they attempt to cling to the tattered remnants of
their moth-eaten faith.
In Segall's view, legal realism accurately describes how judges
decide cases, and honest jurists and academics should acknowledge that
their own policy preferences determine their views on how cases should
be decided." Living constitutionalists accept that policy preferences
determine outcomes in hard cases, and Segall assumes that almost all
constitutional cases that come before the Supreme Court are hard.2 1
First-generation originalists were admirably principled in their
commitment to judicial deference to the political branches. Segall
admires this approach and thinks that courts should uphold laws created
through democratic processes unless those laws are clearly incompatible
with the Constitution.2 2 However, courts have never applied that
standard, and so first-generation originalism, while admirable, is
descriptively inaccurate. Segall contends that "our Supreme Court has
not employed such deference in many constitutional areas in well over
' 23
150 years, and it is most unlikely it will do so in the future.
Contemporary originalism, says Segall, is neither descriptively
accurate nor honest. 24 Contemporary originalists claim the moral high
ground of deferring to the original meaning of the text or the original
intentions of its Framers. In fact, contemporary originalists are just as
likely to reason to a pleasing conclusion as are living constitutionalists,
and they camouflage their policy preferences behind their declarations of
adherence to the originalist "faith." Segall suggests that originalists act

19. See id.at 35.
20. See id.at 4-6.
21. See id at 13, 175 (arguing that the constitutional cases that get litigated involve "vague
text" that "must be constructed in ways that originalist inquiries cannot answer").
22. See id. at 187 (arguing for the advantages of something analogous to the "clearly
erroneous" standard applicable to appellate review of trial courts' factual determinations). Segall
explored this theme in a previous book. See ERic J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME
COURT Is NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 1-9 (2012).
23. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 187.

24.
25.

Id.at 11, 105-06.
See id at 6-7.
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in bad faith when they camouflage their policy preferences with the false
judicial modesty of originalism. 26 At least non-originalists are
transparent and openly acknowledge that judges exercise constitutional
powers of legal discretion.
Part 1H of this Article summarizes Segall's argument, which
highlights the relationship between judicial restraint and originalist
theory. 27 For Segall, federal courts have not exercised restraint since the
Civil War. 28 First-generation originalists correctly diagnosed the
problem, but contemporary originalists exacerbate it with their
increasingly capacious concepts of originalism. Part III explores four
different meanings the term "faith" could have in the context of Segall's
critique of originalism.29 As the title of this Article suggests, Segall is
inclined to treat originalism as a myth or a fable. This Part sketches out
different resonances of "faith" as it might be applied to originalism. Part
IV suggests two alternative stories that one might draw out of Segall's
narrative, which I am calling, following Will Baude and Stephen Sachs,
"originalism with bite" and, following Jack Balkin, "living
originalism."3 Part V offers a brief conclusion.3 1
I propose these competing narratives in Part IV as supplements not
correctives to Segall's engaging and persuasive narrative.32 It would be
hard to improve on Segall's description of originalism from the
perspective of legal realism. Segall's thesis is clear and consistent, his
prose is direct and unadorned, and he knows his material thoroughly.
Those already in Segall's camp will find the book exemplary. His
account may well convince the uninitiated that no judges are originalist
and that academics should stop peddling the fable that judges can be
originalist. However, although Segall attempts to present originalist
ideas as their authors would present them, partisans of originalism likely
will find that he has not done justice to their theories, and they will reject
his claim that contemporary originalism has become indistinguishable
from living constitutionalism. While Segall offers criticisms to which
originalist theory has yet to provide convincing answers, the keepers of

26. See id. at 12 (arguing that originalists do harm by pretending that original meaning
actually informs judicial decision-making and that originalism is a "mistaken faith"). Segall quotes
approvingly Justice Brennan's critique of first-generation originalism as "arrogance cloaked as
humility." Id. at 73.
27.
28.

See infra Part 11.

29.

FAITH, supra note 3, at 25.
See infra Part HI.

30.
31.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.

32.

See infra text accompanying notes 199-205.

SEGALL,
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that faith continue to strive towards such answers even as their paths
diverge from judicial restraint.
II. THE LAST ORIGINALIST

In addition to its introduction and conclusion, Segall's book has
three main parts. In Chapters Two and Three, Segall gives us a sweeping
narrative prelude covering constitutional adjudication from the Early
Republic until the advent of originalism in the 1960s.3 3 Chapters Four
through Six cover academic originalism: the first-generation originalism
of the 1960s and 1970s; the new originalism, which began in the 1990s;
and contemporary originalism of the twenty-first century.34 Chapters
Seven through Nine focus on constitutional adjudication in the Supreme
Court's interpretive practices have
Court and contend that the Supreme
35
never conformed with originalism.
Although Segall is not an originalist, for much of the book he
comes across as a defender of first-generation originalism, chastising
contemporary originalists for their acceptance and even encouragement
of judicial activism. 36 In Segall's ideal world, judges would defer to the
political branches' determinations of constitutionality.3 7 First-generation
originalists believed that they could contribute to the convergence
between their ideal world and the reality of judicial practice. But that
world has never existed, and Segall sees no likelihood that it will ever
exist.38 Moreover, originalism, which once sought to curtail judicial
caprice, now encourages it and provides it ideological shelter. Segall
reminds originalists of how to be a proper originalist, 39 as though he
were the last academic to grasp the political sentiments and the theory of
judicial modesty that sparked the movement for originalism in
constitutional interpretation.
A. Pre-History:The Decline of JudicialDeference
from the Early Republic to the Rise of Originalism
In the beginning, there was deference. Segall finds ample evidence
that the Framers intended that courts should strike down legislation only,
33. See SEGALL, FArrH, supra note 3, at 15-55 (Chapters 2-3).
34. See id. at 56-121 (Chapters 4-6). Segall's names for these three groups are "Original
Originalists," "New Originalists," and "New, New Originalists." Id. at 56, 82, 103. There is some
overlap in the groups.
35. See id. at 122-70 (Chapters 7-9).
36. See, e.g., id. at 103-15.
37. See id at 29.
38. See id at 121, 177-86.
39. See id. at 12-14, 24, 29, 177-86.
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as Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist No. 78, in cases of
"irreconcilable variance" between the challenged legislation and the
Constitution.4" Dred Scott" was the first case after Marbury v.
Madison" in which the Court struck down a federal enactment under
that standard.4 3 Segall, who characterizes Dred Scott as an originalist
opinion," concludes that judicial review remained highly deferential to
legislatures throughout the antebellum period, with only two instances in
which the Supreme Court struck down federal legislation.4 5
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court largely continued the
tradition of judicial deference to legislators. Segall notes a few
exceptional areas in which the Supreme Court struck down federal
legislation in the postbellum era.' Although Segall recognizes that these
areas were very significant, including civil rights, dormant commerce,
federal income tax, and paper money, he does not see them as indicative
of a general decline in judicial deference.47 Rather, Segall maintains, the
real movement away from deference occurred during the Lochner Era
from the end of the nineteenth century until 1937.48
Segall associates the Lochner Era with the demise of judicial
deference to legislatures and also with the rise of hypocritical
invocations of original intention.4 9 During the Lochner Era, the Supreme
Court "struck down hundreds of state and federal laws." 5 This was, for
Segall, the worst of all possible worlds, because the Court invoked
original meaning as it struck down progressive legislation but "the
justices rarely relied on originalist evidence to reach their legal
conclusions." 51 Thereafter came a fifteen-year lull, during which the

40. Seeid. at 15-16.
41. Scott v. Sandford (DredScott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
42. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
43. Id. at 178-80.
44. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3 at 26-28. Segall acknowledges that originalists claim that
Justice Taney "misapplied" originalism in Dred Scott. Id. at 28. He does not address the originalist
argument that Dred Scott is a living constitutionalist opinion that gave rise to the doctrine of
substantive due process-an argument of which originalists are highly skeptical. See, e.g., BORK,
supra note 4, at 28-33 (describing Dred Scott as illustrating the worst consequences of the
substantive due process doctrine); William H. Rehnquist, Observation, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 700-02 (1976) (describing Dred Scott as a classic example of
living constitutionalism).
45. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 24-26 (discussing Keith Whittington's research,
which shows that review of legislation was common, but that legislation was generally upheld).
46. Id. at 36.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 36-38.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 38.
51. See id.
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tamed Court struck down very little legislation.52 However, after World
War II, courts again showed less deference to the political branches than
had pre-Civil War courts;53 of the leading decisions of the 1960s
and 1970s, Segall notes that each "likely would have shocked those
who wrote and ratified either the original Constitution or the
Reconstruction Amendments. 54
In chronicling the demise of originalist influence on Supreme Court
opinions, Segall relies heavily on a remarkable series of articles that
Jacob tenBroek published in the California Law Review in 1938 and
1939."5 tenBroek's research showed that, while Justices from the
founding era through the New Deal would often cite original meaning or
original intent, they rarely consulted any documentary evidence that
would have helped them discover the original meaning of the
Constitution.5 6 Rather, Justices exercised "independent judgment" and
cherry-picked evidence of original meaning to suit their purposes.5 7
Segall also cites to Frank Cross's more recent research, which suggests
that while the Warren Court was more likely than previous Courts to
consult original sources, such sources did not power the Court's
decision-making process. 58 A recent empirical study of the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions confirms these findings.5 9
Segall's historical chapters very successfully show that originalism
has not consistently informed the Supreme Court's constitutional

52. Id. at 43.
53. See id. at 43-51 (discussing the Court's remarkable refusal to back Truman's decision to
nationalize the steel industry during the Korean War, as well as the work of the Warren and early
Burger Courts).
54. See id at 52-53.
55. See id at 40 & 201 n.22, 41-43 (citing Jacobus tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the
United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in ConstitutionalConstruction, 26 CALIF. L. REV.
287 (1938); Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction: Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional and Ratifying
Conventions, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 437 (1938); Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme
Court of Extrinsic Aids in ConstitutionalConstruction: The History of the Times of the Convention,
26 CALIF. L. REv. 664 (1938); Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction: Contemporary Exposition, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157
(1939); Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
ConstitutionalConstruction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV.
399 (1939) [hereinafter Extrinsic Aids, Intent Theory]).
56. Id. at 41; see Extrinsic Aids, Intent Theory, supra note 55, at 403-06 (describing the
documents used by the Court to identify original intent as "ungeneralizable and superficial").
57. See SEGALL, FAITH, supranote 3, at 41.
58. See id at 54 & 204 n.97 (citing Frank B. Cross, Originalism-TheForgotten Years, 28
CONST. COMMENT. 37 (2012)).
59. See Lorianne Updike Toler & J. Carl Cecere with the assistance of Don Willett, Pre"Originalism," 36 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 277, 298-320 (2013) (finding that the Supreme Court
rarely cited to original sources in constitutional cases until the Warren and Burger Courts).
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jurisprudence. Unlike many originalist scholars, he recognizes that the
Court often references original intent or original meaning, but
undertakes no genuine inquiry into either.' As a result, Segall does not
think that appeals to original meaning in any way constrain the
judiciary.6 1 The conservative Courts of the Lochner Era revised
constitutional law to conform to their beliefs; the liberal Warren and
Burger Courts did likewise.62 Both invoked original meaning without
making any significant efforts to discover that meaning.
In these chapters, Segall presents a highly readable history of
constitutional adjudication in the United States. He is willing to meet his
readers where he finds them. He reviews the facts and holdings of cases
with which an academic audience will already be familiar. His book can
be useful to law students or to undergraduates studying constitutional
history and seeking a narrative history of constitutional developments.
His more academically-inclined readers may skim over Segall's reviews
of familiar case law and focus on his characterization of the holdings.
Segall presents familiar cases in the context of his thesis about the
decline of deferential judicial review, and thus even readers familiar
with the case law will see it in a new light.
These chapters may frustrate readers sympathetic to originalism.
Segall's political judgments drive the narrative, and he does not always
note when his readings could be subject to challenge. For example, he
criticizes the Hammer v. DagenhartCourt for inadequate attention to the
Commerce Clause despite the case being about "commerce among the
states."63 But Hammer was about regulation of child labor, which the
Court believed related to manufacture and not to commerce.' Some
contemporary originalist scholarship relies on precisely this distinction,
among others, to argue that Congress's Commerce Clause powers should
60. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 1-5, 84-89.
61. Seeid.at3-6.
62. Compare id. at 38 (making reference to Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), as
one of the many cases in the Lochner Era where "the [conservative] Court struck down hundreds of
state and federal laws dealing with workers' rights, unions, and safety conditions in factories and
other places of employment"), with id. at 52-53 (making reference to some of the "landmark
decisions" of the liberal Warren and Burger Courts and identifying "ten of the most important
liberal decisions decided during [that] time" as: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Reynolds
v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
63. See id. at 38.
64. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-76 ("The grant of power to Congress over the subject of
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to
control the States in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture.").
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be curtailed.6 5 Similarly, Segall stresses that Brown v. Board of
Education, which he justifiably calls "one of the most important
decisions in Supreme Court history," was not reached based on
originalist evidence.66 That is true but unremarkable, as Segall's
discussion of tenBroek's work makes clear.6 7 Segall does not
acknowledge the originalist scholarship that nonetheless claims Brown
as an originalist decision.6"
These oversights are understandable given page limitations and
Segall's desire to tell a story without stopping to answer every
imaginable objection. Still, Segall glosses over some weighty historical
debates in which one would like to see him engage. Originalist
arguments that Dred Scott and Plessy are living constitutionalist while
Brown is originalist may be self-serving, but they still need to
be addressed.
B. Academic Originalism:From Restraint to Incoherence
The central chapters of Segall's book tell a story of decline.
Originalism got its initial impetus as an angry response to perceived
judicial overreach in the 1960s and 1970s. First-generation originalists
made an impassioned plea for judicial deference to legislative action.
When that first generation came under attack for its misplaced
focus on the original intentions of the Framers, originalism took a
textualist turn. However, textualists quickly realized that it was not
always possible to reconstruct original meaning. They acknowledged
that, at times, constitutional decision-makers must engage in
constitutional construction.
Ever since, in Segall's view, originalism has lost the characteristics
that distinguish it from living constitutionalism. 69 New Originalists and
contemporary originalists embrace constitutional construction, and they
65. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 853-62 (2003) (surveying uses of "commerce" in the Pennsylvania
Gazette in the eighteenth century and finding that the term referred to trade, not manufacture);
Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 111-25
(2001) (arguing that the Framers meant for the Commerce Clause to regulate trade, not
manufacture).
66. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 49-51.
67. See id. at 40-43.
68. See, e.g., William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349,
2380-81 (2015) (providing evidence that the Brown Court wrestled with evidence of the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment) [hereinafter Baude, Our Law?]; Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984-86, 1131-40 (1995)
(arguing that most of the politicians who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment believed that school
segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause).
69.

See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 35, 82-102.
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are, at times, willing to adhere to non-originalist precedent. Their allies
on the bench, self-proclaimed originalist Justices, do not apply
originalism to every realm of constitutional adjudication. For Segall, the
only thing that separates contemporary originalism from the liberal
judicial activism that the first-generation originalists opposed is that
judicial activism now serves conservative, libertarian goals, rather than
liberal, progressive ones; what remains, says Segall, is originalism
as faith.7 °
Robert Bork, a conservative, and Raoul Berger, a liberal, epitomize
first-generation originalism for Segall.7" They urged deference to
legislatures based on a commitment to democracy. A handful of
unelected judges ought not to be empowered to negate the will of the
people's representatives.72 Originalism encourages judges to give effect
to the Constitution's original meaning, rather than seeking to effectuate
through their judgments their own policy preferences. 73 It thus calls on
judges to defer to the democratically accountable political branches. If
the political branches stray from the constitutional consensus, the
sovereign people can vote them out of power, but only a constitutional
amendment can address the courts' constitutional errors, and the Framers
expressly rejected any notion of entrusting the judiciary with a
policymaking role.74
There is only one problem with this form of originalism, says
Segall-it does not describe the practice of our judiciary at any point in
U.S. history: "For all their brilliance and legal acumen, both Berger and
Bork were advancing an article of faith more than a realistic appraisal of
the Court's past behavior or a pragmatic blueprint the justices would
ever adopt."75
But Bork's message, especially as filtered through the Reagan
administration's Department of Justice and then disseminated by the
Federalist Society, had a far greater impact than any single judge or
scholar could realistically hope for. As Segall notes, the Federalist
Society now has chapters at every accredited law school in America, and

70. See id.
at 171-91.
71. See id.
at 56-62.
72. See id.
at 57-61.
73. See id.at 3.
74. See BERGER, supra note 4, at 300-11 (recounting that the Constitutional Convention
rejected the suggestion that the judiciary might be empowered as a counsel of revision and noted the
limited notion of judicial review in 1787); BORK, supra note 4, at 3 ("When the Supreme Court
invokes the Constitution, whether legitimately or not, as to that issue the democratic process is at an
end.").
75. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 61.
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76
five Supreme Court Justices are (or were) members. The Federalist
Society's agenda in the 1980s pushed originalism, states' rights,
separation of powers, and judicial restraint, and its members still push
for that agenda in the U.S. heartland as well as within the beltway."
However, first-generation originalism, with its focus on the
Framers' original intentions, was a methodological dead-end. Paul Brest,
78
H. Jefferson Powell, and others subjected it to a withering critique.
New Originalism saved originalism by changing originalism's goals
from the discovery of original intention to original meaning. Segall is
only partially persuaded. As Larry Solum has conceded, one looks to
much the same evidence to discover original meaning as one would to
discover original intentions.79 Moreover, Segall cites three major
criticisms that survive the transition from original intentions to original
meaning. First, Segall maintains, originalism remains susceptible to the
claim that its practitioners engage in "law office history," combing the
80
historical record for cherry-picked evidence. In addition, even New
Originalism lacks democratic legitimacy because women and minorities
were excluded from the Framing. 8 Finally, to the extent that originalism
purports to describe actual judicial practice rather than prescribe best
82
practices, it mischaracterizes our constitutional jurisprudence.
I would add a fourth criticism of intentionalism that applies equally
to textualism and supports Segall's general argument. Paul Brest called
it the problem of specificity.8 3 Brest takes as an example the
84
Constitution's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The
along the lines of what we now call
Framer's intention might have been
"original expected applications., 85 They may have intended to prohibit

76. Id. at 64. Segall counts four Justices, but the addition of Justice Kavanaugh makes five.
77. Id. The extent to which the Federalist Society still advocates judicial restraint is unclear.
Segall's book does not explore the growing disconnect between popular originalism and originalism
on the bench and in the academy. While the former remains concerned with the judicial activism of
unelected judges, the latter increasingly promotes activism in service of originalism.
78. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV.
204 passim (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885 passim (1985). Writing in 1999, Randy Barnett described Brest and Powell's critiques
as having "trounced" intentionalism and "[driven a stake] through its heart." Randy E. Barnett, An
OriginalismforNonoriginalists,45 LoY. L. REV. 611, 612-13 (1999).
79. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 87; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
ConstitutionalConstruction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 459-67 (2013).
80. See SEGALL, FAITH, supranote 3, at 88.
81. Id. at 88-89.
82. See id. at 89.
83. See Brest, supranote 78, at 216-17.
84. Id. at 216 (referring to U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
85. Jack Balkin criticizes Justice Scalia for his adherence to original expected applications
and argues that most originalists believe, as Balkin does, that the Constitution establishes general
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punishments thought cruel and unusual at the time of the Framing.
However, Brest suspects that the Framers did not believe themselves
omniscient and would have wanted later generations to determine for
themselves what constitutes cruel and unusual punishments.8 6 If we
generalize the Framers' attitudes towards constitutional interpretation
based on this example, one can see why Jack Balkin might conclude that
there really is no opposition between originalism and living
constitutionalism.87 The Framers chose vague language, so the argument
goes, expecting future generations to determine the meanings of the
88
Constitution's "majestic generalities" for themselves.
One might think that a critic of originalism would applaud the
movement from intentionalism to textualism. New Originalists embrace
constitutional construction; they acknowledge that, within the
"construction zone," law is made based on the judges' "normative
commitments. 89 New Originalists offer defenses of liberal Supreme
Court decisions, such as those upholding constitutional protections for
same-sex marriage, 90 and, in the case of Jack Balkin, for abortion
rights. 91 These arguments ought to appeal to a liberal non-originalist like
Segall, and yet Segall's heart remains with the first-generation
92
originalists and their commitment to judicial restraint.
Having acknowledged that courts decide constitutional cases within
the zone of construction, New Originalists really have only two options,
according to Segall. 93 They can endorse judicial deference to the
political branches, as did the first-generation originalists, but very few
New Originalists adopt this approach. 94 Most New Originalists choose
the alternative option and become living constitutionalists sub silentio.
They can get there directly by purporting, in Larry Solum's words, "to
principles, whose applications the Framers expected to evolve to meet new circumstances and social
change. See JACK M. BALKtN, LIVING ORIGNALISM 6-12 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING
ORJGINALISM].

86. See Brest, supra note 78, at 216-17.
87. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 3 (arguing that living
constitutionalism and originalism, properly understood, are compatible).
88. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1943) (writing with
trepidation of the judge's task of translating majestic generalities into concrete restraints on state
officials).
89. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 91 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Randy E. Barnett,
Interpretationand Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 65, 69-70 (2011)). Barnett is a New
Originalist.
90. Id. at 92-93 (discussing the arguments of Ilya Somin and Steven Calabresi).
91. Id. at 95-97.
92. Seeid. at 97-101.
93. See id. at 99-100 (presenting a list of three options, of which the last two both end up at
the same position-that is, living constitutionalism).
94. Id. at 99.
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derive guiding purposes or principles.. . to search for the values that are
immanent in the specific provisions and overall structure of the
Constitution."' 5 In the alternative, they can get there indirectly through a
commitment to "original methods originalism," to be discussed below,
which Segall also thinks results in 9a6 pluralistic approach
indistinguishable from living constitutionalism.
In the New Originalism, Segall sees only hypocrisy. Their
methodological sophistication provides the means by which any
outcome can be reconciled with originalism, but because almost all
originalists are conservative, originalism becomes a way to make
conservative policy-driven judicial opinions seem apolitical. In Part IV
of this Article, I present multiple originalist arguments that map
out compromise paths97 between first-generation originalism and
living constitutionalism.
The past decade has seen the rise of new versions of originalism,
which build upon and move beyond New Originalism. Segall's chapter
on what he calls "The New, New Originalists" discusses William Baude
and Stephen Sachs's positivist defense of originalism and John
98
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's original methods originalism.
99
Segall is highly critical of both of these recent originalist innovations.
For Segall, Baude and Sachs's "inclusive originalism" preserves so
much discretion for legal decision-makers that they are no different from
living constitutionalism; Segall hammers away at this conclusion,
repeating it like a mantra on page after page.10 °

95. Id. at 99-100 (quoting ROBERT W. BENNETr & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 152 (2011)).

96.
97.
98.

See id. at 100 (citing Barnett, supra note 89, at 71).
See infra Part IV.
See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 103-21 (discussing JOHN 0. McGINNIS & MICHAEL

B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013) [hereinafter MCGINNIS &
RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION], Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, and William Baude &

Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism's Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 103 (2016) [hereinafter Baude & Sachs,
Originalism 's Bite]).
99. See, e.g., id. at 103-04, 114-15, 121.
100. See, e.g., id. at 105 (predicting that Ed Meese, Robert Bork, and other originalists would
not recognize Baude's "inclusive originalism" as originalist); id at 105-06 (calling Baude's
definition of originalism "[virtually] indistinguishable from living constitutionalism"); id. at 106
(calling Baude's originalism "indistinguishable from 'living constitutionalism'); id. at 108 (calling
Baude's approach to interpretation "no different than the form embraced by living constitutionalists
(and liberals)"); id at 109 (contending that, if Baude is right that originalism is our law, "there is no
substantial difference between originalism and non-originalism"); id at 112 ("If [Baude] is right,
there is no meaningful difference between originalism and living constitutionalism (at least to
judges)."); id. at 114 (calling Sachs's approach "originalism disguised as living constitutionalism");
id. at 115 (calling Baude and Sachs's originalism "not 'originalism' at all").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol47/iss2/10

14

Telman: Originalism as Fable (Reviewing Eric Segall, Originalism as Faith

2018]

ORIGINALISMAS FABLE

McGinnis and Rappaport's work has different problems. They
argue that the supermajoritarian processes by which the Constitution was
adopted and amended make it likely that our Constitution is a good
constitution. 1 ' In developing their argument for why a supermajoritarian
constitution is a good constitution, McGinnis and Rappaport make use of
a modified version of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, 1' a modified version
of John Rawls's veil of ignorance, 0 3 and a heavy dose of welfare
consequentialism. °4 They conclude that enactments approved by
supermajorities are far more likely to lead to welfare maximization than
enactments approved by simple majorities. 1"' Simple majoritarian
processes will produce worse results. Judges thus ought to interpret the
Constitution according to the original methods that the Framers
anticipated would be used on the document.'" Such original-methods
originalism best preserves the original constitutional design, according
to McGinnis and Rappaport.l° 7
Segall raises two objections to original-methods originalism. First,
Segall quite rightly rejects McGinnis and Rappaport's blithe claim that
the Constitution's worst flaws have been addressed through the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments. 10 8
McGinnis and Rappaport view liberal judicial activism as unnecessary
and even counterproductive because our country's history of
discrimination based on race and gender are better addressed through the
Constitution's formal amendment process.'0 9 However, no constitutional
mulligans can, as Segall puts it, "make up for the reality that the
experiences and values of people of color and women were completely
absent from the process.""' Segall also objects to the authors' refusal to
apply their original methods theory to any contemporary constitutional
issues."' If they attempted to do so, Segall contends, they might have to

101.

Id. at 116 (quoting McGiNNIS &

RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION,

supra note 98, at 3,

11).
102. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 98, at 48-49.
at 42-44.
103. See id.
104. See id.at 19-20 (introducing their view of the ideal constitution as "one that produces the
maximum net benefits for the nation").
105. See id at 3 (contending that originalism will generate beneficial results because "it
captures the meaning that passed through the supermajoritarian process"); id.at 11 (reducing their
supermajoritarian argument to three logical steps).
at 116-38 (discussing their arguments in favor of original methods originalism).
106. See id.
107. Seeid at 116.
108. See SEGALL, FArTH, supra note 3, at 116-21 (referencing their argument as set forth in
McGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION, supranote 98, at 106-12).
109. See McGNNIS & RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 98, at 90-94.
110. SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 119.
111. Id. at 120.
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confront the inherent contradictions of their original-methods
originalism.' 12 As Kurt Lash, a fellow originalist, has pointed out, the
Framers had no preconceptions of how the Constitution ought to be
interpreted, as the Constitution was the first of its kind." 3 It may well be
that the actual original methods included interpretive approaches that
McGinnis and Rappaport reject, such as constitutional construction and
living constitutionalism.

114

C. Potemkin's Village on the Potomac:
The Supreme Court's (Non) OriginalistPractice
Segall devotes a chapter to the jurisprudence of Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the Supreme Court's two most prominent self-proclaimed
originalists." 5 As I have argued elsewhere," 6 Justice Scalia practiced
originalism under the motto, "[A] thing worth doing is worth doing
badly.""' 7 Clarence Thomas expressed more confidence in his abilities,
saying that being a Supreme Court Justice was a thing worth doing and
invoking his grandfather's adage, "Any job worth doing is worth
doing right."118
These very different mottos suggest two very different versions of
originalism. Justice Scalia invoked his motto in the context of
acknowledging that originalism requires historical research and that
Supreme Court Justices have neither the time nor the training to
undertake thorough historical research.1 19 Still, Justice Scalia maintained
that even with its flaws, originalism remains a "lesser evil" when
compared to living constitutionalism.1 2 ° In the same article, perhaps the
112. Id.
113. Id. at 121, 217 nn.98-100 (citing Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30
CONST. COMMENT. 149, 158-66 (2015)).
114. See id. at 120. I have provided some evidence that original methods included both
construction and something like living constitutionalism in another article. See D. A. Jeremy
Telman, John Marshall's Constitution: Distinguishing Originalism from Ipse Dixit in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, in VAL. U. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES 58, 58-59 n.256
(Sept. 2018) (draft), http://ssm.com/abstract-3249726.
115. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 122-40 (Chapter 7, "The Non-Originalism of Justices
Scalia and Thomas").
116. See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism:A Thing Worth Doing..., 42 OHIO NORTHERN U.
L. REv. 529, 532 (2016) [hereinafter Telman, Originalism].
117. See id at 532, 552-56 (discussing Justice Scalia's decontextualized adoption of an adage
from G.K. Chesterton).
118. See id. at 557 & n.192 (noting Justice Thomas's recollection of his sentiments upon being
confirmed as a Supreme Court Justice (quoting CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER'S SON: A
MEMOIR 26 (2007))).
119. See Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CiN. L. REv. 849, 856-61
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Lesser Evil].
120. Id. at 864; see also id. at 849, 862-64 (likening originalism to "the librarian who talks too
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most eloquent, honest, and transparent originalist credo ever composed,
Justice Scalia called himself a "faint-hearted originalist"; that is, one
willing to adhere to some non-originalist precedent. 121 Justice Thomas
expresses much greater faith in his own ability to discern original
meaning and much less respect for established but non-originalist
precedent. 122 However, Segall sees no significant difference between the
Court's self-proclaimed originalists. 123 They both consult original
24
meaning when it suits their purposes and ignore it when it does not. 1
Justices Scalia and Thomas both joined in opinions striking down
campaign finance restrictions, regarding giving money to campaigns as
forms of political speech protected under the First Amendment. 125 Both
opposed affirmative action 126 and "dogmatically insisted that every
127
plaintiff in every federal case must allege a unique personal injury.'
Justice Scalia articulated idiosyncratic views on the Fourth
Amendment. 128 Their positions on these matters, Segall maintains,
lack support in129 "persuasive arguments from either text or
original meaning.'
In the case of the Court's anti-commandeering and Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the situation is worse. The Rehnquist Court
adopted the anti-commandeering rule, which prohibits the federal
government from directing the states to help it implement federal
laws. 3 ° As Segall points out, this rule contradicts Alexander Hamilton's
explication of the Constitution in the FederalistPapers.'3 ' The rule is
also inconsistent with the structural interpretation of the Constitution,
derived from the Supremacy Clause, that informed the Supreme Court's
prior rejection of an anti-commandeering doctrine in the 1930s. 132
Justices Scalia and Thomas made very good policy arguments in support
softly").
121. Seeid. at864.
122. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, Clarence Thomas's Jurisprudence Unexplained, 4 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 535, 553-56 (2009) (praising Thomas for his willingness to overrule non-originalist
precedent); Lee J. Strang, The Most Faithful Originalist?:Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and the
Future of Originalism, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 873, 876-78 (2011) ("Justice Thomas frequently
advocates overruling nonoriginalist precedent, and his calls are frequently made without any other
justices joining him.").
123.

See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 122-23.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id.at 123-25.
Id. at 125-27.
Id. at 127-30.
Id. at 135.
See id. at 138-39.
Id.at 124.
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992).

131.

See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 131-32.

132.

See id.at 130, 132-33.
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of their opinion, but originalist Justices are not supposed to rely on
policy arguments. They are supposed to defer to legislators' reasonable
constructions of the Constitution.
Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined in the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, which flatly contradicts the Amendment's
clear language. 13 3 Despite the text's prohibition on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over a suit between a state and a citizen of another
state,134 the Court has interpreted the Amendment to prohibit jurisdiction
over cases between states and their own citizens.135 The originalist
Justices ignored Justice Souter's persuasive originalist arguments for
why this construction of the Amendment should not be extended to
federal question jurisdiction.'36 Segall concludes that Justices Scalia and
Thomas have no interest in originalism when originalism does not
37
promote their policy goals. 1
Segall devotes a chapter to District of Columbia v. Heller,'3 8 a
reasonable decision, as originalists often cite the case as evidence of
originalism conquest of the mainstream. 139 Both the majority and the
dissenters, the argument goes, used originalist methods in determining
that the Second Amendment protects, in the majority view, or has
nothing to do with, in the dissenters' view, the individual right to bear
arms. 4 ° For Segall, the case "reflects how dangerous, incoherent, and
misleading the doctrine [of originalism] can be in the hands of Supreme
Court Justices who are not competent at historical analysis.' 41 Justice
Scalia's "lesser evil" chickens have come home to roost. Perhaps
originalism, like brain surgery, is not the sort of thing that is worth doing
even if done badly. 142
On Segall's reading, Heller, with Justice Scalia's made-up list of
"presumptively lawful regulatory measures," 4' 3 does not evidence

133. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 46, 53-58, 72-73 (1996).
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
135. Here the interpretation dates back to the nineteenth century case, Hans v. Louisiana,134
U.S. 1, 9-10, 20-21 (1890).
136.

SEGALL, FAITH, supranote 3, at 134.

137. See id. at 134-35.
138. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
139. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 141-55 (Chapter 8, "Originalism Without Strong
Deference Cannot Work").
140. See id.at 141.
141. Id. at 143.
142. See Telman, Originalism, supra note 116, at 553-56 (noting that Chesterton's adage,
which Scalia adopted, referred to leisure activities, not to professions).
143.

SEGALL, FArH, supra note 3, at 145.
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originalism's ascendency; it is an instance of judicial lawmaking and
living constitutionalism.'" As Segall notes, Circuit Judge IHarvie
Wilkinson, whose originalism still adheres to the principle of deference,
viewed Heller as the conservative Roe. 145 The outcome pleased
conservatives, but the Justices overreached their authority." For Segall,
Heller illustrates the dangers of originalism unaccompanied by great
deference. 147 Judges are not historians, and the evidence that Segall
presents indicates that, absent a culture of deference, originalist judges
will use historical materials selectively to achieve their desired results or
will ignore such materials if they point to an undesirable outcome. 148
In his chapter on Justices Scalia and Thomas, along with his chapter
on Heller, Segall argues that originalism cannot provide a coherent
theory of interpretation that escapes the pull of personal policy
preferences. 49 In his last substantive chapter, Segall delivers a final
illustration of his claim that originalism also does not provide an
accurate description of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.150 He
discusses the Court's rulings on: paper money, aid to parochial schools,
free speech generally and commercial speech in particular, and interstate
commerce.' 51 In all of these areas and others detailed in other
chapters, the Court's rulings have shifted with the political winds.
Segall concludes:
The Supreme Court has updated, backtracked, or dramatically changed
its views on most of the litigated constitutional law issues of the last
one hundred years. Most of these alterations have been sparked by
changes in societal and judicial values, modem technologies, and
political considerations. Judicial analysis of text and original meaning
other than to support
has not played a major role in these developments
152
grounds.
other
on
made
likely
quite
decisions

144. Id.
145. See id. at 145-47. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009) (likening the activism informing the Heller
decision to that of Roe v. Wade).
146. See SEGALL, FAITH, supranote 3, at 145-46.
147. See id. at 141-45.
at 147-55.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 122-24, 139-41, 144-45, 147-55.
at 156-70.
150. See id.
151. Seeid. at 157-69.
152. Id.at 169.
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Today, Segall argues, academics and judges can no longer defend
originalism as an intellectual movement. 153 They can only defend it as an
article of faith.154
III. WHAT Is THIS ORIGINALIST FAITH?

Segall first introduces his notion of the originalist faith as an
analogue to religious belief-to have faith is to accept a belief or system
of belief without reference to empirical evidence. 155 At other times,
15 6
however, Segall uses "faith" to mean something akin to myth or fable.
Segall is too careful a scholar to impute to originalists beliefs they never
express. He never asserts that originalists do not really believe that
original meaning can be recovered or can bind constitutional
interpretation. However, he sometimes presents their views as too
farfetched to be taken seriously. 157 They promote their originalist "faith,"
it seems, as a political strategy, not because they are committed to
discovering the Framers' true vision nor because they would feel bound
by that vision even if it led to unacceptable results.
To the extent that Segall implies that academic and judicial
originalists do not really believe in the myth they have created or the
fables they recount, Segall uses "faith" in a third way, to mean
something akin to ideology or false consciousness. 158 Originalist
ideology prevents its non-specialist adherents from seeing the ways in
which they are manipulated by the originalist myth. Finally, Segall uses
"faith" to mean something like credo. 5 9 One announces one's allegiance
to originalism in order to signal to others one's political commitments,
which tend to be a mix of conservatism and right-wing libertarianism.
This is originalism at its most cynical, a purely instrumental originalism
indifferent to its substantive similarities to living constitutionalism.
A. Faith as Quasi-ReligiousBelief
Americans' reverence for their Constitution borders on religious
fervor.16 ° Originalism is like religion in that it attempts "to render an
153. Seeid.at169-70, 190-91.
154. Id.at 170,191.
155. See id. at 1 (quoting Faith, MERRLAM-WEBSTER, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
faith (last updated Oct. 15, 2018)).
156. See, e.g., id. at 185-86.
157. See id. at 186-91.
158. See id.at187-91.
159. Seeid. at191.
160. See, e.g.,
Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294-95
(1937) (contending that the Constitution has become America's "totem and its fetish" and that
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otherwise chaotic order coherent" and supplies "a set of beliefs capable
'
Jamal Greene has characterized
of channeling our conduct."161
with an evangelical
commingled
"conspicuously
originalism as
movement that tends to disfavor departures from the original meaning of
God's word., 16 2 Greene has analogized originalism to the Christian
theological notion of the fall.163 "In the originalist narrative the Founding
Era is a prelapsarian state, a pure source of constitutional meaning and
legal authority. Originalism promises a return to this state and a
cleansing of the corrupting influence of unelected judges over
constitutional law.,

164

Originalism and fundamentalism are linked because originalists
elevate the status of the Constitution to that of a sacred text. 165 Jamal
Greene and Peter Smith have produced empirical evidence of the
correlation between those who favor originalism in constitutional
interpretation and those who favor Biblical literalism. 166 They provide a
basis for that connection in their explorations of the two movements'
similar approaches to reading and understanding texts. 167 The connection
between Biblical literalism and "strict construction" are easily conjured,
but it is harder to understand why originalism would appeal to
sophisticated practitioners of legal hermeneutics.
With respect to first-generation originalists, Segall provides an
explanation. They do not provide a description of what courts actually
do; rather, they provide a belief about what courts could do. However,
American culture has replaced an authoritarian Bible with an authoritarian Constitution and
established a state church in secular form); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil
Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REv. 123, 123-25, 130-37, 150 (1979) [hereinafter Levinson, The
Constitution] (discussing our tradition of treating the Constitution as the sacred scripture of the
United States' civil religion but questioning whether such treatment of the Constitution can lead to

unity).
161.
162.

Levinson, The Constitution, supranote 160, at 136.
Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1, 7 (2009) [hereinafter

Greene, Origins of Originalism].
163. Id. at 81.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (1988) (attributing to the
Constitution a central role as a "sacred text" in the United States' "civil religion"); Greene, Origins
of Originalism,supra note 162, at 7-8 (suggesting that many Americans are uncomfortable with the
work of judges who decide constitutional cases through the use of reason and creativity "in the
exegesis of sacred texts"); Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45
AM. J. JuRis. 65, 85 (2000) (arguing that the Constitution has become the "sacred scripture" of
American politics).
166. See Jamal Greene et al., Essay, ProfilingOriginalism, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 356, 370-73,
372 tbl.5, 385-86, 406-07 tbl.9d (2011); Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, BiblicalLiteralism and
ConstitutionalOriginalism, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693, 721-50 (2011).
167. See Greene et al., supra note 166, at 385-86, 400-07; Smith & Tuttle, supra note 166, at
721-25, 737-50.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:741

for Segall, originalism's historical inaccuracy is no accident. 168 We can
never expect judges to adhere to original meaning, and anyone who tells
you differently is promoting a belief system, not a scholarly
perspective.1 69 The belief system can be pernicious because it suggests
that originalist judges constrain their own discretion. They claim to
imitate Odysseus and fetter themselves to the mast of original meaning
in order to restrain their own caprice. Lay people adopt the faith that
only originalism can constrain judges. 7 ° Originalists stress constraint
because without it, judges act as unelected legislators. In order to avoid
the politicization of the courts, judges must simply apply the law, and,
originalists claim, adherence to original meaning is the best, if not the
only, way to ensure judicial adherence to the rule of law. 1 ' Segall well
understands that people need to have faith in the courts. 17 2 However, he
thinks they should have faith not in the mythical ability of judges to
but in the integrity of the judges and the
discern original meaning
73
judicial process itself.'
B. Faith as Myth or Fable
For some, it seems, originalism is a quasi-religious belief,
associated with the sanctity of the Founding and the saint-like quality of
particular Framers. For others, it may be little more than a useful myth
that can be deployed to battle objectionable judicial practices. In modem
For Segall, originalism is not
parlance, however, myths are not true.
174
true; it is nothing but a myth or a fable.
Although there can be overlap, myth and fable are generally
something less exalted than faith. Faith, such as belief in the Immaculate
Conception or the divine inspiration of scripture, can provide a basis for
one's social orientation and value system. Faith may also encompass
myths or fables. However, one may subscribe to a myth, like the urban
legend that cell phones cause gas stations to explode, without organizing
one's life around them. Fables are moral tales. They are edifying even if
we do not accept them as literal truth. Segall at times treats originalism

168. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 56-61.
169. Seeid. at61.
170. Id. at 179.
171. Id.at 180, 183.
172. See id. at 185-86.
173. See id. at 187-88 (advocating reliance on the Supreme Court to "decrease our passions on
many fundamental questions" and contending that it has done so "reasonably well" on most issues
since the Civil War).
174. See, e.g., id. at 185-88.
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like a fable.175 The people who tell the tale know that it may not be true.
Originalists know that appeals to original meaning or original intent
have never effectively constrained judges. Still, they "pretend that text
and original meaning are important to constitutional cases because we
need that myth to justify the Court's strong role in enforcing
constitutional rules. 176
When scholars advocate originalism as the only means of ensuring
judicial restraint, they embrace a myth. 177 Judges actually cannot be
constrained by originalism, says Segall, because its current versions all
devolve into living constitutionalism. 178 There are other mechanisms for
constraining judges, most of which are not very effective. If originalists
were truly interested in judicial restraint, they would encourage judges to
exercise "extreme deference to the elected branches.' 79 Originalists no
longer encourage such deference.
Segall faults originalism for its lack of realism.' 80 Judges inevitably
"make decisions based on their own values, priorities, and politics, as
well as the culture they grew up in and reside in."' 8 1 Rather than
adopting the originalist myth that we can correct the errors of the past
and set constitutional adjudication on the righteous path, Segall counsels
acceptance.' 8 2 Originalism is neither an accurate description of judicial
practice nor a coherent interpretive strategy that will guide future courts.
As it is used today, Segall claims, it "is only a matter of faith." ' 3 In this
instance, I take him to be saying that originalism is both a myth and a
fable. It is a false narrative, like a bedtime story, with a soothing, if
soporific, effect.
C. Faith as Ideology or False Consciousness
If we put together Segall's implied narratives of faith and myth, we
get something potentially more sinister. When people who know better,
or should know better, peddle originalism, they seek to mislead. They
inculcate law students and lay people into an ideology that then plays an
insidious role in our political culture. Faith in originalism prevents,
175.
176.
177.

See id.at 180, 187-88.
Id.at 187-88.
See id. at 114-15 (suggesting that Will Baude and Stephen Sachs "need to maintain the

faith that judging... is separate from ordinary politics" in order to maintain "their faith in
constitutional law").
178. See id.at 112-14.
179. See id.at 29.
180. See id.at 190-91.
181. Id.at 191.

182.
183.

See id.
Id.
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Segall tells us, "a fruitful discussion of how the highest Court in the land
engages in its most critical function - the resolution of constitutional
18 4 At the same
cases often implicating our most fundamental values.,
time, originalism props up the Justices' prestige and authority as
guardians of a culture that treats the Framers and the constitutional text
as sacred objects of reverence.185
According to Segall, "The American people pay a large price for
this mistaken faith that the original meaning of the text drives Supreme
Court decisions."1" 6 It obscures judicial processes, and permits judges
who cite originalism as the inspiration for their legal rulings to dodge
inquiry into their actual motivations.187 Personal values, not commitment
18
to original meaning, drive judicial opinions, says Segall. To believe
otherwise is to be blinkered by "an overly optimistic, but wholly
'18 9
Judges and
unrealistic, and ultimately dangerous, article of faith."
academics promote originalism to make themselves appear like neutral
guardians of the law; lay people who adopt originalist ideology suffer
from a form of false consciousness that prevents them from seeing
originalism for what it really is, right-wing judicial activism.
D. Faith as PoliticalCredo
Segall's characterization of originalism as a faith exists in some
tension with his insistence that contemporary originalism is no different
from living constitutionalism.1 9° One wonders what the content of such a
faith could be or why originalists would insist on their commitment to
such a malleable set of beliefs. The answer may be that originalism is a
useful political tool that one uses to bolster one's political allies and
cudgel one's adversaries. Segall illustrates this sense of originalism as
faith through a discussion of Larry Solum's congressional testimony in
support of Judge (now Justice) Neil Gorsuch. 191 Solum vouched for
Judge Gorsuch's originalist credentials and urged Senators to confirm
his appointment to the Supreme Court. 192 He further develops this sense

184. Id. at 7.
185. See id.at 12 (crediting originalist faith with allowing "justices to maintain their prestige
and authority for many Americans who believe strongly in the sanctity of text").
186. Id.
187.
188.

See id.
See id at14.

189.
190.
191.

Id.at 194.
See id. at 96-98, 101-02, 185-86.
See id.at 171-77.

192.

See id.
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of originalism as a political faith in a section called "Why Pretend
'1 93
Originalism Matters?"
Segall characterizes Solum's testimony as a "dogmatic" defense of
originalism.' 94 Dogmatism is not what one would expect from Solum, a
New Originalist who embraces constitutional construction 195 and thus is,
for Segall, no different from a living constitutionalist. 196 Solum's
testimony is "dogmatic" because it attempts to draw clear lines "between
originalist judges and [living constitutionalist] judges who believe that
they have the power to impose their own values on the nation."' 197
Solum's scholarship and the history that Segall recounts suggest exactly
the opposite. The "faith" that Solum promotes is not a method of
constitutional interpretation; it is a political faith embodied by the
Supreme Court's current conservative majority.
Segall describes originalism as "an effective political tool" in the
world of judicial politics. 19' It enables conservatives and libertarians to
claim that the judges whom they support are constrained by text while
liberals would superimpose their own values onto the Constitution.' 99
Conservative radio hosts, such as Mark Levin and Rush Limbaugh,
insisted upon this opposition between conservative judges who follow
the law and activist liberal judges, creating what Jamal Greene has
characterized as an originalist "aesthetic."2 ° Justice Scalia also
effectively spread the originalist gospel when he made national speaking
tours pronouncing the Constitution "Dead, Dead, Dead."2 1 But
originalists generally pay very little attention to the text or ratification
history of the Constitution in most circumstances. They too use
constitutional interpretation as a means of inscribing their own personal
values and normative judgments into the law. 22
While Segall treats Jack Balkin as a New Originalist,2 °3 he clearly
differs from most originalists in his political orientation. That may
explain why, despite his methodological agreement with many
contemporary originalists, he has not been universally welcomed into the

193. See id. at 179-86.
194. Id. at 171-72.
195. See id. at 97-98.
196. See id. at 100 (asserting that Solum fails to distinguish the way judges act in the
construction zone from how a living constitutionalist judge interprets the Constitution).
197. Id. at 173 (internal quotations omitted).
198. See id. at 180.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 180-81.
201. Seeid. at 181.
202. Id. at 184-85.
203. See id. at 92, 95-97.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 47:741

originalist camp. 2°4 Balkin's outsider status among originalists provides
further evidence that the originalist faith is a political faith rather than a
belief about the proper approach to constitutional interpretation.
IV. BEYOND DEFERENCE AND RESTRAINT

Since the rise of New Originalism in the 1980s, originalism and
non-originalism have converged. Segall characterizes this convergence
2 °5
as capitulation: originalists are just like living constitutionalists. In the
space that remains, I would like to offer two alternative readings of the
history that Segall presents. These alternatives are not intended as
corrections to Segall's history, as if he had gotten something wrong.
Rather, I maintain that the history of originalism is like an extended
rabbit/duck image. Different people looking at the same narrative can
view it very differently, depending on what one chooses to foreground
and what one relegates to footnotes. Those who see a rabbit are not
wrong; those who see a duck are not wrong. However, the ability to see
both the rabbit and the duck may promote more dialogue between the
rival camps.
Contemporary originalists think that their approach has become
more refined and nuanced without abandoning its principles. This is
what I will call, following Baude and Sachs, the "originalism with bite"
reading of the facts. A completely different picture emerges from Jack
Balkin's "living originalism" approach. While Segall regards New
2 6
Originalism as stripping originalism of everything but its name, "
Balkin thinks the opposition between originalism and living
2 7
constitutionalism has always been based on a misunderstanding. "
Judges can be committed to fidelity to the constitutional text and to the
principles contained therein while also understanding that the application
of that text and those principles can change as new circumstances arise.
204. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin 's Originalism with No
Regrets, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 611, 613-21 (2012) (characterizing Balkin's "text and principle"
approach as yielding the same results as non-originalism); James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of
Originalism, 2012 U. ILL L. REV. 669, 675-81 (pointing out the similarities between Balkin's
approach and Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Constitution and predicting that originalism might
split into warring camps); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning
Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 752-62 (2012) (rejecting Balkin's premise that constitutional
provisions have an abstract meaning); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the
Possibility of ConstitutionalRedemption, 91 TEx. L. REv. 147, 162-72 (2012) (expressing doubt as
to whether Balkin's progressive image of constitutional redemption can be reconciled with fidelity
to the constitutional text).
205.

See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 81, 185.

206. See id at 82-102.
207. See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 3; SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at
95-96, 103.
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A. Originalismwith Bite
As Segall highlights, originalism is riddled with paradox.20 8 Justice
Scalia long ago recognized that little separated his version of originalism
from moderate non-originalism. 2°9 Subsequent developments in
academic originalism provide ample support for Justice Scalia's
confessional observation. Insistent on original meaning as a constraint
on judges, many originalists nonetheless acknowledge that in many
constitutional areas, original meaning "runs out. '210 That is, linguistic
and historical analyses do not resolve hard cases. Those cases are
decided in what some originalists have called the "zone of
construction, '211 where judges have to decide cases according to their
own reasons and principles.2 12
In addition, some originalists are willing to follow even nonoriginalist precedent,2 13 further muddying the distinction between
originalism and non-originalism. For example, Baude and Sachs's
"inclusive originalism" entails: constitutional construction or
liquidation; 214 presumptions, such as the presumption of constitutionality
and common-law background rules, like waiver;21 5 adherence to
17
precedent; 216 widely accepted practices lacking originalist pedigrees; 2
and a recognition that judges exercise discretion in choosing which legal
rules to apply and how to apply them. 1 8 With all of these interpretive

208.

See, e.g., SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 171-91.

209.

See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 119, at 861-62.

210.

SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 16-18, 91-92; see, e.g., Barnett, supra note 89, at 68-70

(acknowledging that the meaning of the Constitution sometimes runs out and that "[o]riginalism is
not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out"); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic
Originalism 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law: ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Ser. No.
07-24, 2008).
211. See Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST.

COMMENT. 119, 121-23, 128 (2010) (arguing that once interpretive tools are exhausted,
constitutional decision-makers operate within a zone of construction, where they undertake "a
particularly political task, a creative task involving normative choices in a realm of constitutional
indeterminacies").
212. See KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSmuCrION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITrrTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999) ("Constructions do not pursue a preexisting if deeply hidden
meaning in the founding document; rather, they elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable,
interpretive meaning, where the text is so broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful

but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.").
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Scalia, Lesser Evil, supra note 119, at 861-62.
Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2354, 2356-58.
Id.at2357-60.
Id. at2358-61.

217.
218.

Id.at2361.
Id. at2360.
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tools and options available, it is hard to see how originalism provides
much of a constraint on constitutional decision-making.
One incremental way to imagine originalism with bite is to regard
the debate between originalism and non-originalism as a disagreement
'
or about the size of the
about how often original meaning "runs out"219
"zone of construction." Originalists are much more optimistic than nonoriginalists about our ability to reach conclusions about the
Constitution's original meaning. As a result, contemporary originalism
does not become living constitutionalism just because it concedes that
exceptional cases will be decided in a zone of construction. In addition,
New Originalists do not think that judges working in the zone of
construction operate free from constraint.2 2 Admittedly, they have yet to
articulate a satisfying theory of how constraint works within the zone of
construction, and they need to confront Segall's and political scientists'
findings that judges decide constitutional issues in a way that accords
with their policy preferences. However, recognition of the zone of
construction does not automatically mean that judges are not constrained
by original meaning.
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport's "original methods"
originalism suggests that originalism can have bite because, while it can
be open to numerous interpretive modalities available at the time of the
221
Framing, it excludes modalities that the Framers would have rejected.
McGinnis and Rappaport include in the latter category both
2 22 They also are
constitutional construction and living constitutionalism.
quite confident that original methods originalism provides the method of
223
resolving most disputes about the Constitution's meaning. Even where
textual meaning runs out, they think that originals interpretive methods
224
can resolve ambiguity without recourse to construction.
Will Baude and Stephen Sachs offer a functional argument in favor
of what they call "inclusive originalism." 225 Their originalism comprises
219. See Telman, Originalism, supra note 116, at 551 ("To some extent, the difference
between originalists and non-originalists are differences with regard to the frequency with which
original meaning runs out.").
220.

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The GravitationalForce of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L.

REv. 411, 418-20 (2013) (noting that original meaning of the text constrains construction);
Lawrence B. Solum, OriginalistMethodology, 84 U. CHi. L. REv. 269, 294-95 (2017) (proposing
techniques to ensure constraint within the construction zone).
221.
222.

See McGiNNIS & RAPPAPORT, GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 98, at 116-26.
See id. at 138-53.

223. See id. at 153 (arguing that original methods originalism provides "distinctive resources to
address indeterminacy in the actual instances it occurs").
224. See id. at 140-44.
225. See, e.g., Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2352-53, 2361-63 (advocating an
"inclusive" originalism that captures the jurisprudential approaches of jurists as different as Justice
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three elements. First, consistent with Solum's two principles, they regard
the original meaning of the Constitution to be "the ultimate criterion for
constitutional law."2'26 Second, they embrace "the validity of other
'
methods of interpretation or decision."227
Finally, Baude and Sachs
maintain that "[o]ur law is still the Founders' law, as it's been lawfully
changed."22' 8 The change in question encompasses constitutional
precedent (if "lawful") and even changed circumstances "to the extent
' In their view,
that they lawfully derive from the law of the founding."229
originalism is "our law," in that some judges openly embrace it, no
judges disavow it in their constitutional opinions, and when originalist
views clash with non-originalist views in constitutional cases,
originalism wins out.23 ° Originalism is our law, say Baude and Sachs,
and everybody ought to abide by the law.231 Judges especially should
abide by the law, because they take an oath to uphold the Constitution
and are professionally committed to the rule of law.2 32
Baude and Sachs view their enterprise as nuanced and sophisticated
but still principled. 233 Their originalism has bite because, despite being
"inclusive," it still excludes clearly non-originalist approaches. 234 They
also have a ready list of doctrines that they do not think fit within their
inclusive originalism. 23 5 It is not surprising that they reject Blaisdell and
the doctrine that permits states to interfere with contracts in cases of
economic emergency. Beyond that, they provide a breathtaking list of
constitutional doctrines that they would revise or vacate:
We likewise doubt the pedigree of modem cases on executive
agreements; jury numbers or unanimity; counsel comment on failure to
testify; one-person one-vote; diversity jurisdiction for D.C. citizens;
"commerce" regulation of wholly intrastate activity; administrative

Kagan and Justice Alito); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 819, 874-88 (2015) (describing original meaning as "the Founders' law,
including lawful changes").
226. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2355; see Solum, supranote 1, at 1937-43.
227. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2355.
228. Baude & Sachs, Originalism'sBite, supra note 98, at 104 & n.8 (quoting Sachs, supra
note 225, at 838).
229. Id.
230. See Baude, Our Law?, supranote 68, at 2374-75.
231. See id. at 2391.
232. Id. at 2392-95.
233. See id.
at 2351-63. See generally Baude & Sachs, Originalism's Bite, supra note 98.
234. Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2363 (distinguishing inclusive originalism from
interpretive pluralism, which does not recognize the primacy or originalism as a mode of
interpretation).
235. See Baude & Sachs, Originalism's Bite, supra note 98, at 108.
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even commandeering state
adjudication of private rights; and maybe
236
officers or Article III limits on standing.

The range of doctrines that Baude and Sachs revisit undermines
Dean Chemerinsky's argument that originalism shies away from
opposition to popular or long-standing legal doctrines. Nor is their list
consistently conservative or libertarian in its political valence. Still,
Baude and Sachs's recitation of cases and doctrines that they reject only
gets us so far in understanding how they determine when legal and
historical precedents satisfy inclusive originalism's requirement of
"lawful change." Segall's work should inspire originalist scholars to
specify how their approaches preserve the principle of judicial restraint.
B. The Convergence of Originalism andLiving Constitutionalism
While academic originalists can look a lot like living
constitutionalists, non-originalists concede that they also pay close
attention to original meaning. The non-originalist Justice Kagan
2 '37
proclaimed that "we are all originalists now," and Jack Balkin defends
23 8

abortion rights under the banner of "text and principle" originalism.
Jack Balkin's living originalism, like Segall's realist approach,
acknowledges that judges' values inevitably inform interpretive
practices.2 39 The aim of his version of constitutional faith is what he calls
"redemptive constitutionalism," which entails "meeting the challenges of
changing conditions in ways that seek to further the promises and
commitments of the [constitutional] plan., 24" However, Balkin maintains
that, for originalists and living originalists alike, the test of good judicial
technique ought not to be adherence to some faith or the recitation of
shibboleths. 241 Rather, constitutional decision-makers have an obligation
24 2
of good-faith interpretation and fidelity to the Constitution. Still, faith
plays a crucial role in Balkin's work. He promotes faith not in the
original meaning of the Constitution but, drawing on Sanford
236. Id. (footnotes omitted).
237. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing on S. 111-1044 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lllth Cong. 62

(2010) (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United States).
238.

See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OriginalMeaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293-95

(2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion].
239.

See BALKIN, LIvING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 3-5; SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at

186-91.
240.

See BALKiN, LivNG ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 75.

241. See Balkin, Abortion, supra note 238, at 292-94.
242. See id. at 295 (defining "fidelity" to encompass an appreciation not only of the words of
the Constitution understood in context and according to their original meaning but also of the
principles that underlie the text).
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Levinson's work, in "our faith in the constitutional project and its
future trajectory. 24 3
Much of Balkin's approach is consistent with Segall's. Sometimes
the constitutional text leaves little room for doubt as to its original
meaning. When it says that the President must be at least thirty-five
years of age, 2 " we all know what that means. With respect to such
provisions, we are all originalists, but it hardly matters, because courts
are not asked to adjudicate, for example, whether a five-year old can be
President because she is thirty-five in dog years. Balkin identifies
constitutional "standards," such as the prohibition on "unreasonable
searches and seizures" and the "right to a 'speedy' trial., 245 Finally, there
are what Balkin calls "principles," such as "freedom of speech" and
"free exercise of religion." 246 The debate between living
constitutionalists and originalists may come down to the extent to which
one is willing to accept liberality in the construction of standards and
principles. The differences are real and constitute the continuing
battlegrounds separating those who think that originalism has bite from
those who believe that the text of the Constitution cannot, and perhaps
should not, constrain constitutional decision-makers.
Segall and Balkin both want to preserve freedom for each
generation to construe rules and standards as they see fit. 2 47 Balkin
thinks that constitutional decision-makers can be constrained by their
duty of fidelity to the Constitution. 248 Segall appears to think that
deference provides the only mechanism for constraining judges in
constitutional adjudication. 249 But the emphasis on deference is not very
helpful when the political branches make constitutional determinations.
They have nobody to whom they ought to defer, and because of the case
or controversy requirement, the initial determination on almost all
constitutional issues comes from institutions other than courts.25 ° Segall
and his originalist interlocutors have surprisingly little to say about
constitutional decision-making outside of courts, but that is where

243. See JACK M. BALKiN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 2 (2011).
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 5.
245. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 6.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 6-7, 9-12; SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 14, 178, 187-91.
248. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 13-16, 19-20.
249. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 7, 187.
250. To his credit, Balkin recognizes that "[a]ll three branches of government build institutions
and create laws and doctrines that serve constitutional purposes, that perform constitutional
functions, or that reconfigure the relationships among the branches of the federal government, the
states, and civil society." BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 85, at 5.
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the action is and so constitutional theorists ought to turn their
attention thither.
When they do so, the question of deference will become a much
smaller part of the originalist project. The tougher questions-and it is
frankly curious that so few originalists are asking them-relate to
constitutional interpretation in the political branches. If Balkin is right,
and constitutional legitimacy turns on a political faith, that faith ought to
apply to political actors beyond the courts. We ought to expect
constitutional actors to act in good faith and commit themselves to
fidelity to the Constitution. We ought to hold politicians accountable for
their failure to do so and not shrug off self-serving, partisan, or
Machiavellian tactics as politics as usual.
V. CONCLUSION

Segall's book is long overdue and will fill a huge gap in the
literature. He ably tells the story of originalism's development as an
academic theory, a judicial practice, and a popular movement. He
pitches his writing at the perfect level, so that it can be read profitably by
experts and novices alike. He provides a strong thesis equating
contemporary originalism with its opposite number, living
constitutionalism. He admires the first-generation originalists' principled
embrace of judicial restraint, but he cautions that our Supreme Court has
never approached their idea of good constitutional adjudication.
Segall thinks that legal realism accurately describes the real
workings of the Supreme Court.2 1 1 However, an accurate description of
how an institution works provides only a useful starting point for a
discussion of how the institution ought to work. Segall provides very
little normative discussion of how future judges should decide
constitutional cases. Originalists, on the other hand, offer numerous
normative defenses of their method, sounding in democratic theory,252
libertarianism, 25 3 Aristotelian ethics, 254 welfare consequentialism, 25 5 and
251. See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 4.
252. See KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REvtEw 127-59 (1999) (grounding originalist theory in popular

sovereignty and democratic lawmaking).
253. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
LIBERTY 358-59 (Rev. ed. 2014).
254.

THE LOST

CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF

Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue's Home in Originalism,

80 FORDHAM L. REv. 1997, 2028-39 (2012).
255. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution,
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010) (arguing that "originalism advances the welfare of the present day
citizens of the United States because it promotes constitutional interpretations that are likely to have
better consequences today than those of nonoriginalist theories").
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legal positivism,

25 6

to name just a few variants. Absent a principled

defense of legal realism, people may well place their faith in the
normative version of originalism that best suits them. The originalist
fable retains its appeal, especially for those who have long hoped to
awaken from what they regard as the standardless nightmare of
legal realism.
Despite his critique of originalism as faith, Segall concedes that
people "need to have faith that our Justices will do their best to reach
sound decisions., 257 However, for Segall, that faith must arise from our
trust in judges' "characters, judgments, and values," and not in "vague
text or disputed historical accounts of the origins of that text. '258 Segall
leaves us with a challenge. He provides persuasive evidence that judges
decide cases according to their own policy preferences and not according
to the law, and he implies that, regardless of the successes or failures of
the originalist project, they will continue to do so. 259 Such a practice
seems to doom our divided nation to a continued struggle over the makeup of the Court and to a Court in which only one-half of that nation can
repose its faith while the other half decries its activism.

256.

See, e.g., Baude, Our Law?, supra note 68, at 2363-91.

257.

See SEGALL, FAITH, supra note 3, at 193.

258.
259.

See id at 14.
See id at 12-14.
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